Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

State of Utah v. Aaron Tomas Herrera : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Linda M. Jones; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Joanne C. Slotnik; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Mark S. Kouris;
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Aaron Tomas Herrera, No. 20010175 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3154

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20010175-CA

AARON TOMAS HERRERA,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ROBBERY, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-301(1999),
AND POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A
RESTRICTED PERSON, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-10-503 (3) (a) (1999) , BOTH SECOND
DEGREE FELONIES, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, PRESIDING

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
MARK S. KOURIS
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney
Attorneys for Appellee

LINDA M. JONES (5497)
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc,
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

WuhcIlrllC)

Attorneys for Appellant
w,

" n COUrt of Appeals

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

" ^ K o f t h e Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20010175-CA

AARON TOMAS HERRERA,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ROBBERY, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-301(1999),
AND POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A
RESTRICTED PERSON, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-10-503(3)(a)(1999), BOTH SECOND
DEGREE FELONIES, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, PRESIDING
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
MARK S. KOURIS
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney
Attorneys for Appellee

LINDA M. JONES (5497)
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT'S UNPRESERVED CLAIM CANNOT CONSTITUTE
PLAIN ERROR, NOR SHOULD THIS COURT CONSIDER
IT PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 22(e)
a.

b.

II.

7

Lack of factual findings does not constitute
plain error because the law does not mandate
that a court enter factual findings before
imposing consecutive sentences

7

Appellate review is not justified pursuant
to rule 22(e) because defendant has failed
to demonstrate that the court imposed sentence
in an illegal manner

9

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WHERE THE RECORD
REFLECTS THAT THE COURT CONSIDERED DEFENDANT'S
HISTORY, CHARACTER, AND REHABILITATIVE NEEDS AS
WELL AS THE GRAVITY AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
CHARGED OFFENSES

CONCLUSION

10
18

ADDENDUM - No Addendum Necessary

i

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986)

17

State v. Carson, 597 P.2d 862 (Utah 1979)

13, 17

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

8

State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App. 19, 18 P.3d 1123

8

State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978)
State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989)

2, 7, 12, 18
2

State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985)

12

State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728 (Utah 1980)

12

State v. McCovev, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990)

11

State v. Montova, 929 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1996)

11

State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454 (Utah App. 1993)

13, 17

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

12

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991)

11

State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236 (Utah App. 1997)

8

State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990)

17

State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1997)

10

State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388 (Utah 1957)

12

State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995)

8, 9

State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993)

8, 9

State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665 (Utah 1997)
ii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12

STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1995)

9

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1999)

2, 8, 9, 11

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1999)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1996)

1

Utah R. Crim. P. 22

6, 7, 9, 10

iii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 20010175-CA

AARON TOMAS HERRERA,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for one count each of
robbery and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person, both second degree felonies.

This Court has appellate

jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)
(1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing
consecutive sentences, where the record reflects that the court
had read the presentence investigation report documenting
defendant's history, character, and rehabilitative needs as well
as the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and, further,
had made a personal assessment of defendant's credibility at the
sentencing hearing?
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial
1
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court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally
relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally
prescribed limits.

State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah

1989)(citations omitted).

The Utah Supreme Court has noted that

"the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects
the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can
properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court."

State

v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401, governing concurrent and
consecutive sentences, provides:
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant
has been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent
or consecutive sentences for the offenses....

(4) A court shall consider the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses and the
history, character, and rehabilitative needs
of the defendant in determining whether to
impose consecutive sentences.
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1), -401 (4) (1999) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After a carjacking followed by a high speed chase, defendant
was charged with aggravated robbery and aggravating kidnaping,
both first degree felonies, as well as failure to respond to an
officer's signal to stop and possession of a dangerous weapon by
2
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a restricted person, both third degree felonies (R. 3-5). He
eventually entered a guilty plea to robbery, subject to
enhancements for using a dangerous weapon in the commission of
the offense and acting in concert with two or more other persons,
and to possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person,
both second degree felonies (R. 43-45, 50-57).

After reviewing a

presentence investigation report, the trial court sentenced
defendant to the Utah State Prison on both charges and ordered
that the sentences run consecutively (R. 59-61). l

This timely

appeal followed (R. 63).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Around 2 a.m. on a November morning, Keith Garcia was
driving home from his job in his new Honda Civic, which he had
had for less than a week (R. 79: 6, 11, 14).

"[T]wo turns away"

from his house, three males who had been walking down the road
"waved [him] down." (Id. at 7, 16). Unconcerned, Keith stopped
the car (Id. at 17). Defendant approached the driver's window;
the other two individuals, who were juveniles, circled around to
the passenger side of the vehicle (Id. at 7, 17) .

1

The court ordered defendant to serve an enhanced sentence
of 6-15 years on the "robbery with the gun enhancement" (R. 61).
On the charge of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person, the court applied the group enhancement and ordered "1-15
years and 1-5 years" (R. 61). This is clearly incorrect.
Pursuant to an amended information, defendant entered pleas to
robbery with enhancements for use of a gun and acting in concert,
and to possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person
(R. 43-45, 50-57) .
3
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Defendant spoke first, demanding that Keith open the door
(Id. at 21). When Keith just sat there, looking at him,
defendant pulled out a gun and commanded him to "open [your]
fucking door" (Id. at 8, 20-22) . Keith complied (Id. at 8, 22) .
Defendant immediately put the gun to Keith's head, while one of
the other individuals moved around and put a knife to his side
(Id. at 9, 23).
Defendant ordered Keith out of his car (Id. at 23). As soon
as he tried to get out, however, defendant said, "never mind,"
and pushed him back in (Id. at 9, 24-25) . All three perpetrators
then got into the vehicle, with defendant sitting directly behind
the driver's seat (Id. at 9-10).

They told Keith they were going

"jacking" (Id. at 10, 24). Keith said he'd drive them wherever
they wanted to go (Id. at 24).
Keith drove the few blocks to his own home.

He testified

about his action at this juncture:
I said I was going to stop the car and I was
going to let them take it. And I took my
hand off the steering wheel and I just
stopped. I was just like this [witness lifts
both hands about shoulder high], and I said
you guys take my car. Do what you want, you
know. And then that's when I got out of the
car.
(Id. at 32; accord id. at 10-11).

Defendant responded that it

was fine, that they were just borrowing the car, and that he
would bring it back (Id. at 12). As Keith got out of the car,
defendant hopped into the driver's seat and "peeled out" with
4
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Keith's brand new car (Id. at 12, 28). Keith ran home and called
the police (Id. at 12).
A patrol sergeant located the vehicle in the neighborhood
where the carjacking had occurred (Id. at 35). A high speed
chase ensued, with defendant and the pursuing police vehicle
reaching speeds of up to 90 miles per hour through both
commercial and residential areas (Id. at 35-38) . Finally, when
the chase failed to end after defendant drove through a full
chain link fence, the officer executed a "pursuit intervention
technique" (Id. at 38-3 9).

The technique was intended to cause

the car driven by defendant to spin out, but instead the vehicle
slammed into a curb, the tires "popped", and the car rolled,
finally coming to rest on the front lawn of a residence, with the
driver's side against the ground (Id. at 40-41, 47-48).
The officer described what happened next:
[W]e had a lot of officers . . . coming into
the area, and we had two dogs out on the
leash and lots of deputies' firearms pointed
at the suspects and [defendant] was trying to
kick his way out, punching, kicking, rocking
back and forth with the car. So we just held
on him to see what he was going to try to do
. . . . [H]e realized he was surrounded by
police officers, kind of gave us a look like,
all right, caught, and he put his hands in
the air.
(R. 41). The police then executed a felony stop (Id. at 42).
The same officer later interviewed defendant.

He testified:

"[Defendant] was pretty nonchalant about the whole thing, telling

5
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me jokes and stuff on the way to the substation. . . . Once we
got him [sic] I could tell - he was what [w]e call tweaking" (Id.
at 55). The officer described "tweaking" as observable behaviors
associated with coming off a methamphetamine high, such as
twitching and rapid eye movement (Id. at 55-56).

Describing the

subsequent interview, the officer testified: "[Defendant] would
say, initially, I don't remember a thing, and then he would for
sure tell me that he didn't have a gun.
forth.

So it was back and

He could remember stuff and then he couldn't (Id. at 56).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by imposing consecutive sentences without entering findings of
fact that demonstrated its consideration of all the statutory
sentencing factors.

He raises this argument either as plain

error or pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e).

Any

error the court might conceivably have committed, however, could
not be "plain" because there is no settled appellate law to guide
the sentencing court to the result defendant seeks.

And because

the court did not impose the sentence illegally, rule 22(e)
provides no ground for review of defendant's unpreserved claim.
Should the Court nonetheless choose to reach the merits,
defendant's claim fails because there is no legal requirement
that the court make findings of fact before imposing consecutive
sentences and, further, because he has not shown that the trial
1
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court did not consider all of the statutory factors.

Indeed,

defendant gives short shrift to the presentence investigation
report, which explored all of the statutory factors, and wholly
ignores the court's interchange with defendant at the sentencing
hearing.

Ultimately, the trial court simply interpreted and

weighed the data before it differently than did defendant.
In this case, it cannot be said that "no reasonable [person]
would take the view adopted by the trial court."
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).

State v.

Consequently, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by ordering consecutive
sentences.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DEFENDANT'S UNPRESERVED CLAIM
CANNOT CONSTITUTE PLAIN ERROR, NOR
SHOULD THIS COURT CONSIDER IT
PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 22(e)
a. Lack of factual findings does not constitute plain error
because the law does not mandate that a court enter factual
findings before imposing consecutive sentences.
While defendant argues that findings of fact should be
required before a court imposes consecutive sentences, he failed
to raise the issue or challenge the lack of record findings in
the trial court.

For this reason, he raises his claim as plain

error, arguing that "the trial court committed plain error when
it ordered [defendant] to serve consecutive prison terms without

7
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making findings on the record in light of relevant statutory
factors."

Br. of App. at 7.

The law is well-settled that to prevail in a plain error
analysis, defendant must demonstrate that the trial court erred,
that the error should have been obvious, and that, absent the
error, he had a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome.

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).

Even

assuming arguendo that the trial court did err in not entering
findings of fact, defendant would still have to prove that the
error was obvious or "plain."

"To show obviousness of the error,

[defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of
trial."

State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App. 19 f 6, 18 P.3d 1123;

accord State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997)("Utah
courts have repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not
plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial
court").
Defendant concedes that the sentencing statute, section 763-401(4), does not require explicit findings on the record.
Br. of App. at 8.

See

Nonetheless, he argues that "Utah case law

supports such a determination."

Id.

For this contention, he

cites two cases, State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995) and
State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993).

Both Smith and

Strunk, however, are minimum mandatory sentencing cases, governed
by a specific statute that mandated findings of fact on the
(

8
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record whenever a trial court departed from the middle level of
severity.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(5) (a), (d) (1995) . In

contrast, as defendant concedes, the statute at issue here makes
no mention of findings of fact.
(1999).

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401

For this reason, defendant's reliance on Smith and

Strunk is misplaced.
No settled Utah law, either statutory or judicially
fashioned, requires findings of fact before a trial court can
impose consecutive sentences.

Consequently, any error in failing

to enter findings cannot constitute plain error.

Defendant's

argument, therefore, necessarily fails under a plain error
analysis.2
b. Appellate review is not justified pursuant to rule 22(e)
because defendant has failed to demonstrate that the court
imposed sentence in an illegal manner.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) provides that "[t]he
court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in
an illegal manner, at any time."

Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e).

Defendant contends that the trial court here "imposed consecutive
sentences in an illegal manner."

Br. of App. at 7-8.

Specifically, defendant seems to be arguing that the trial
court's lack of record findings evidences its failure to consider
all statutory sentencing factors, necessarily resulting in an
2

In essence, defendant is asking this court to fashion a
new rule of law. Such a request, however, cannot come before the
court in the procedural posture of plain error.
9
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illegally imposed sentence.
Defendant's reliance on rule 22(e) as a basis for appellate
review is misplaced because he has failed to demonstrate that the
sentence was imposed illegally.

As has been discussed, no

appellate or statutory law mandates that a trial court enter
findings of fact prior to entering consecutive sentences.
Furthermore, where the record shows, as it does here, that the
trial court had before it information regarding all statutory
factors, a reviewing court assumes that the trial court
considered them.

See State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651-52

(Utah App. 1997)(sentencing court properly considered statutory
factors where relevant evidence was presented through record
evidence, including presentence investigation report).
Consequently, rule 22(e) does not provide a ground for appellate
review.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES WHERE THE RECORD REFLECTS
THAT THE COURT CONSIDERED
DEFENDANT'S HISTORY, CHARACTER, AND
REHABILITATIVE NEEDS AS WELL AS THE
GRAVITY AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
CHARGED OFFENSES
Because the law does not require findings of fact,
defendant's argument is reduced to a contention that the trial
court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentences
without first considering all of the statutory sentencing
10
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factors.

He assumes that because the trial court did not

articulate factual findings, it did not consider all of the
factors.3

See Br. of App. at 15-20.

Defendant's assumption,

however, is unsupported by the law.
Section 76-3-401 of the Utah Code governs the trial court's
authority to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences.

This

statute directs the court to "consider the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant."
401(4).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

A trial court may thus abuse its discretion if it

imposes a sentence without considering all of the factors that
are legally relevant to the sentencing determination.

See, e.g.,

State v. McCovev, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990); State v.
Montova, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996).
The court's discretion in weighing the statutory factors

3

Based on this argument, defendant asks this Court to
"vacate the consecutive sentences and remand the case to the
trial court for proper consideration of the facts in light of the
statutory factors." See Br. of App. at 14. In essence, then,
defendant seeks a resentencing. Id. at 22. Such a remedy,
however, is off the mark. Adult Probation and Parole had
completed a comprehensive evaluation of defendant. Defendant had
read the presentence report and offered corrections to it. The
court, therefore, had before it all data relevant to the
sentencing determination and ample evidence to support the
consecutive sentences it imposed. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
774, 787 n.6 (Utah 1991)(reviewing court upholds trial court in
absence of findings when it would be reasonable to assume court
actually made such findings). Under the circumstances, even if
defendant prevailed in his argument, the appropriate remedy would
be a remand for entry of findings based on the undisputed record
evidence, not a resentencing.
11
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reflects the general principle that courts are accorded broad
discretion in sentencing matters.

Plainly, the trial court is in

the most advantaged position to make the highly individualistic
assessments required in sentencing decisions.

See State v.

Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997) (sentencing "necessarily
reflects the personal judgment of the court").

In deciding the

appropriateness of a particular sentence, a trial court must
consider many intangibles, like the defendant's "character,
personality, and attitude, of which the cold record gives little
inkling."

State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957); see

also State v. McClendon, 611 P,2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980).
Moreover, a sentencing court's assessment of defendant's
character and feelings of remorse may be based, at least in part,
on the court's personal observation of defendant's body language,
demeanor, and tone of voice, none of which are reflected in the
record on appeal.
1994).

See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah

On review, then, the appellate court regularly defers to

the trial court's decision unless it is clear that "no reasonable
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court."
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887.
The sentencing statute, while directing consideration of all
factors, does not require the court to accord each of the factors
equal weight.

See, e.g., State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117-19

(Utah 1985) (recognizing that sentencing judges generally give

12
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considerable weight to circumstances of crime); State v. Carson,
597 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1979)(judge has discretion in determining
weight given to sentencing recommendations contained in
evaluation reports).

Nor does the statute preclude a court,

having considered all of the circumstances, from determining that
punishment should take precedence over rehabilitation.

See State

v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) ("trial court did
not abuse its discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing
defendant rather than rehabilitating him").
Defendant's argument fails because he has not demonstrated
that the trial court did not consider all the statutory factors.
Rather, he seems to be arguing only that the court weighed the
factors improperly, failing to give due weight to the
interpretation of the facts he would like to be dispositive.
The preliminary hearing testimony and the presentence
investigation report in this case contained information
addressing all statutory factors. As to the gravity and
circumstances of the offense, defendant's actions in kidnaping
Keith Garcia at gunpoint, taking his car, and engaging in a highspeed chase with the police through neighborhoods and commercial
areas, both on and off the streets, not only put the victim at
risk, but also endangered members of the public.
Defendant's ten-year criminal history involved multiple
felony convictions, prison time served in Colorado, and a variety

13
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of other Colorado criminal charges whose disposition was unknown
(PSR at 7-8) .4 His family history was marked by poverty,
alcoholism, and drug abuse (Id. at 11). He began consuming
alcohol at age 12 and abusing it by age 15. And while defendant
expressed a willingness to attend alcohol abuse counseling, the
presentence investigator reported that defendant believed he was
"not in need of such therapeutic treatment" (Id.).
Perhaps most significantly, defendant began smoking
marijuana at age 8, using it daily for the next 10 years.

By age

14, he was using cocaine and methamphetamines as well, and for
the two years prior to the current crime, he used
methamphetamines daily (Id.).

Defendant stated that "drugs are

'all [he's] ever known'" and that they were "'pushed onto him' by
his family" (Id. at 12). He had not worked at all for two years
because of his drug abuse (Id.).
As to defendant's character, the officer who testified at
the preliminary hearing reported to the presentence investigator
that defendant was "not cooperative" and that he "never owned up
to the truth" (Id. at 7). The investigator observed,
"[Defendant] is minimizing his participation in this offense,
reporting [that] he let the victim know the gun was broken and

4

Defendant self-reported that he had charges as far back
as 1983, when he was a juvenile, although the presentence
investigator was unable to locate records to substantiate this
information (PSR: 7) .
14
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did not have any bullets" (Id. at 15). The court further
explored defendant's attitude towards his criminal conduct at the
sentencing hearing.

Responding to the court's query about a

Colorado felony conviction for ''menacing," defendant explained
that the term meant "brandishing a weapon" and that he pled
guilty only to get out of jail (R. 80: 3) . The following
exchange then ensued:
The Court

I've got to tell you that when
somebody denies having
committed a crime that they've
pled guilty to, I don't give
it any credence.

Defendant:

I was drunk in a Circle K and
I was eating some Hogi
sandwiches - . . .

The Court:

I'm a little concerned that
you're not accepting
responsibility for your past.

Defendant:

I accept the responsibility.

The Court:

How are you accepting
responsibility?

Defendant:

I did my time for it. I
accepted it. I pled guilty to
it. . . .

The Court:

But you're saying you didn't
do it.

Defendant:

I pulled a knob out of my
pocket while the lady was
calling officers because I was
eating sandwiches -

The Court

Why did you pull the knob out
of your pocket?
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R. 80: 4.

Defendant:

I was drunk.
remember.

I don't even

The Court:

You're in major denial.

Finally, as to defendant's rehabilitative needs, they

were obviously quite substantial.5

Nonetheless, the court

sentenced defendant to the maximum term on each felony and
ordered that the sentences run consecutively.

In doing so, the

court stated:
I've given you as much as I can give you. . .
and it wasn't a tough choice. Your choices
have left me with no choice and when I look
at Mr. [Keith] Garcia and I look at you, and
I listen to what you have to say about your
past actions, your present actions, I see no
trace of remorse. I see no acknowledgment of
responsibility and in the letter there are
pat phrases about I'm so sorry, I hope this
is something you can get over. I have no
sense that you have any responsibility in
your own mind for this and I think you are a
very dangerous individual....
[M]any things go into a [j]udge's
consideration, many considerations are part
of sentencing. One is protection of the
community. That is the principle reason for
the sentence. The other is to deter, or one
of the others, is to deter further conduct of
this type[,] and then there's simply
punishment.

[T]he bottom line is you have had a hard

5

There is no record evidence, however, to support a
positive prognosis for treatment. Indeed, the clear implication
from defendant's lengthy history of alcohol and drug abuse and
his continuing denial was that his rehabilitative prognosis was
poor.
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life. There's no doubt about it[,] but a lot
of people who have a hard life, even those
who turn to crime, stand before me and say
I've done everything they've said I've done.
You didn't say that. You have an excuse for
everything you've ever done in your life and
this is inexcusable. . . . [T]hese crimes are
so abhorrent that you leave me with no choice
on the sentence and it's forthwith.
Id. at 23-24.

The sentencing court's rationale for its sentence

is unambiguous.6

The court determined that the violent nature of

defendant's conduct, combined with his life-long dysfunctional
history and consistent pattern of denial, mandated that
protection of the public, deterrence, and punishment should take
precedence over rehabilitation and leniency in sentencing.

Such

a weighing of the statutory factors is precisely what a
sentencing court is bound to do and is plainly within its broad
discretion.

See Nuttall, 861 P.2d at 458 (no abuse of discretion

where court emphasized punishment over rehabilitation); State v.
Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 268 (Utah 1986) (no abuse of discretion
where court emphasized retribution over rehabilitation).
Under the undisputed factual circumstances of this case, it

6

Defendant asserts that "the facts bearing on the court's
consecutive sentencing order were ambiguous." Br. of App. at 12.
As the court's ruling and the supporting record evidence
indicate, however, the facts were clear and undisputed.
Defendant's assertion of ambiguity more accurately focuses on the
weighing of the factors, a matter plainly within the province of
the sentencing court. See, e.g., Carson, 597 P.2d at 864
(discussing court's discretion in weighing sentencing
recommendations); State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah
1990)(discussing court's discretion in weighing aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in sentencing).
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cannot be said that "no reasonable [person] would take the view
adopted by the trial court."

Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. The

court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in imposing
consecutive prison terms.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
consecutive sentences for robbery and possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this lb

day of August, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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